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I. MARSHALL, TEXAS, THE UNSEEMLY CAPITAL OF THE
PATENT WORLD
Marshall, Texas may seem like an inconspicuous small town on any map
of the United States, but it carries immense significance to patent litigators.
Famed as the patent litigation capital of this country, the small town of
Marshall, Texas saw nearly half of all patent infringement suits filed in
2015.1 For a long period of time until earlier 2017, patent owners were
able to bring a suit of infringement against a corporate defendant anywhere
the accused products were sold, which equated to almost any district in
the country.2 The flexibility in venue usually gives rise to forum shopping—
plaintiffs bringing suits in districts that are most favorable to them but
have little jurisdictional ties to either party of the case. Over recent years,
Marshall, Texas has gained enormous popularity among patent owners
because of its patent right-sympathetic juries and plaintiff-friendly procedural
rules.3
In light of the concentration of patent infringement lawsuits in only a
couple of district courts, venue reform has always captured close attention
from legal scholars, judges, and patent law practitioners. In May 2017,
the Supreme Court issued the ground-breaking opinion of TC Heartland,
LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, LLC, which brought about major
changes to the legal framework of venue in patent litigation.4 However,
the Supreme Court opinion did not effectively end Marshall, Texas’s reign
in venue popularity as many had hoped. Accordingly, the quest for
superior venue laws continues. This is an important mission because on
the one hand, patent owners should have meaningful choice of venue to
enforce their legally protected interests, while on the other, reasonable
distribution of patent cases in accordance with judicial economy benefits
the patent system in large. As will be discussed, the balance in venue law

1. This statement is based on patent case filing statistics for 2015. See infra text
accompanying note 13.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
3. Loren Steffy, Patently Unfair, TEX. MONTHLY (Oct. 2014), http://www.texas
monthly.com/politics/patently-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/EEE6-6ELX].
4. TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517
(2017) (“[A] domestic corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of
the patent venue statute . . . .”). For a detailed discussion, see infra Part IV.
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is unlikely to significantly improve unless targeted congressional reform
takes place.
One optimized solution before Congress is the Venue Equity and NonUniformity Elimination Act (VENUE Act) of 2016.5 The VENUE Act is
a targeted patent venue reform bill aimed to restrict venue to a limited
number of forums, including a corporate defendant’s residence or principle
place of business, or, alternatively, where the patent owner or the alleged
infringer’s specific acts relating to the patent-in-suit are found.6 The proposed
venue law is similar to the current jurisdictional scheme in Abbreviated
New Drug Applications (ANDA) litigation under the Hatch-Waxman
Act.7 Because of the similarities between the VENUE Act and ANDA
litigation, a parallel study of the two closely related types of patent litigation
will shed light on the potential impact of the bill if it were adopted. Part
II of this Comment will provide background information on the concentration
of patent infringement suits. Part III will briefly track the recent development
of patent venue law. Part IV will delve into the legal analysis of TC Heartland.
Part V will introduce the proposed venue reform under the VENUE Act.
Part VI and Part VII will engage in a parallel analysis of the VENUE Act
and ANDA litigation. Part VII will also discuss the potential effect of the
proposed venue reform and respond to criticism of the VENUE Act.
II. PATENT CASE CONGLOMERATION AT THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
The city of Marshall, Texas is home to the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas. Although Marshall encompasses mostly rural
areas, and few major corporations or high technology companies are
headquartered there, this district has seen an increasingly large number of
patent cases in recent years and proved to be the most popular venue for

5. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong.
§ 2 (2016).
6. Id. For a detailed illustration and discussion of the venue provisions in the
VENUE Act, see infra Part VII.
7. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the owner of a patented drug can bring an
infringement suit against a generic version’s manufacturer in the accused infringer’s state
of residence or in a forum where the infringing act occurs. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, § 102, 98 Stat. 1585, 1594–95 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 (2012)). For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part VI.
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patent owners to bring infringement lawsuits.8 A significant force that
contributed to Marshall, Texas’s busy patent docket is the rise of non
practicing entities (NPEs), also notoriously known as patent trolls.9 As
their name suggests, NPEs do not invent or produce invention; instead,
they purchase patents for the sole purpose of monetizing patent rights
through litigation.10 NPEs flock to the Eastern District of Texas to file
infringement suits against corporate defendants, forcing these corporations
into a remote forum and leveraging the costs and burdens of litigation for
value more than the patented technology itself.11 Due to its prevalence,
NPEs’ patent litigation practice has drawn major media attention and
extensive criticism in the legal community.12
Recent filing statistics underscore the congregation of patent cases in
the Eastern District of Texas. In 2015, a total of 2,540 patent cases—a

8. See Steffy, supra note 3 (analyzing the disproportionately busy docket of patent
lawsuits in the small town of Marshall, Texas and calling it “the worst thing that ever
happened to intellectual property law”).
9. The term “patent trolls” or “NPEs” is generally applied to non-manufacturing
patent owners, either individuals or companies, who purchase and assert patents as their
sole business model, with no intention of creating or manufacturing a product using the
patented technology. Todd Klein, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.:
The Supreme Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 295–96
(2007).
10. Id. See generally Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A
Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
1 (2017) (comparing patent litigation across districts and providing explanations for the
Eastern District of Texas’s popularity).
11. In 2015, 95% of the patent lawsuits filed in the Eastern District of Texas, and
67% of all patent lawsuits were initiated by NPEs. Joe Mullin, Trolls Made 2015 One of
the Biggest Years Ever for Patent Lawsuits, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 5, 2016, 9:38 AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/01/despite-law-changes-2015-saw-a-heap-of-patent
troll-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/9DZH-E5JD]. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
famously referred to the Eastern District of Texas as a “renegade jurisdiction” for its
reputation as the go-to jurisdiction for patent litigation. Transcript of Oral Argument at
10–11, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).
12. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, A Patent Reform We Can All
Agree On, WASH . P OST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in
theory/wp/2015/11/20/why-do-patent-lawyers-like-to-file-in-texas/?utm_term=.cc5a7c98fec7
[https://perma.cc/C3R9-SC4G] (“The staggering concentration of patent cases in just a
few federal district courts is bad for the patent system.”); Julie Creswell, So Small a Town,
So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/
business/24ward.html?_r=3&pagewanted=1&ref=technology&oref=slogin (describing the
influx of patent lawsuits and lawyers in Marshall); Last Week Tonight with John Oliver
(HBO television broadcast Apr. 19, 2015) (describing the practice of patent trolls abusing
the system by stockpiling patents and threatening lawsuits); This American Life: When
Patents Attack!, WBEZ (July 22, 2011), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/
episode/441/when-patents-attack [https://perma.cc/RK62-C87X] (showing ghostly shell
offices in Marshall, Texas that non-practicing patent owners employ to establish
jurisdictional ties).
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staggering 43.7% of all patent cases—were filed in this district, which is
nearly as many cases as filed in the next three most active districts combined.13
In comparison, in 2015, only 545 cases were filed in the entire state of
Delaware, despite the fact that Delaware is where most United States
companies are incorporated.14 One district judge of the Eastern District of
Texas in particular, Judge Rodney Gilstrap, heard nearly one-third of all
patent cases in 2015, twice as many as the next most active patent judge.15
The busy patent docket in Marshall, Texas had far reaching ramifications:
the high volume of patent cases processed by one single court inevitably
led to poor quality. The Federal Circuit affirmed only 39% of decisions
coming from the Eastern District of Texas in 2015, compared to around
70% for other patent-heavy districts.16
A combination of factors drive the flux of patent infringement cases to
the Eastern District of Texas, including local procedural rules that are
more favorable to patent owners and sympathetic jurors that are more
likely to award generous damages.17 For example, local court rules within
the Eastern District require parties to file briefs within a certain timeframe

13. Lex Machina Releases Annual Patent Litigation Year in Review Report, LEX
MACHINA (Mar. 16, 2016), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/2015-patent-litigation
year-in-review-report/ [https://perma.cc/FWN3-65VY].
14. Brian Howard, Lex Machina 2015 End-of-Year Trends, LEX MACHINA (Jan. 7,
2016), https://lexmachina.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Lex-Machina-2015-End-of
Year-Trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU89-RPYE]; About Agency, ST. DEL., http://corp.delaware.
gov/aboutagency.shtml [http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml].
15. Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s
Patent Cases, MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/
read/the-small-town-judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases [https://perma.cc/
K6FK-YFLL] (stating Judge Gilstrap heard 1,686 of 5,819 new patent cases filed in the
U.S. in 2015). Due to the high volume of patent cases assigned to Judge Gilstrap, if each
case were to go to trial, he would have to complete four to five trials every day of the year,
including weekends. See Dennis Crouch, Law Professors Call for Patent Venue Reform,
PATENTLYO (July 13, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/07/professors-patent-reform.
html#ftnref5 [https://perma.cc/24NJ-KXJK].
16. Ryan Davis, EDTX Judges’ Love of Patent Trials Fuels High Reversal Rate,
LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2016, 10:11 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/767955/edtx-judges
love-of-patent-trials-fuels-high-reversal-rate [https://perma.cc/7S9P-Y3LW].
17. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 250
(2016) (arguing that a pro-patentee jury pool that values property rights and the Eastern
District’s use of procedural rules and discretion in procedural matters tilt the handling of
patent cases in favor of patentees); see also Love & Yoon, supra note 10, at 4 (arguing that the
accumulated effect of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim construction makes the
Eastern District predictably expensive for accused infringers and thus attractive to patent
owners).
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and limit the length of filings; these rules are intended to expedite potentially
lengthy patent trials but instead have turned into litigation leverage for
patent holders to get damages in a speedy trial.18 The Eastern District of
Texas also has the lowest rate of granting summary judgment, at 0.8%,
compared to a national average of 3.7%.19 This apparent sense of hostility
to granting summary judgment further increases patent owners’ chance of a
favorable resolution because they win over 60% of trials but only 29% at
grants of summary judgment.20
Accordingly, to eliminate the problems with patent case concentration,
forum shopping, and disproportionate popularity of a few districts, venue
reform legislation that qualifies patent owners’ choice of venue and restores
the balance of case filings in accordance with judicial economy is the most
effective approach.21
III. THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT VENUE LAW
Legislative venue reform is much needed because judicial interpretation
of the current venue statutes has limited reach to rein in the popularity of
the Eastern District. To understand the legal conundrum, a brief historic
review of patent venue law is necessary. Two statutes are particularly relevant
to venue in patent cases—the patent-specific venue statute and the general
venue statute.

18. See Rogers, supra note 15.
19. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 17, at 251–52; see Joe Mullin, Why Patent Trolls
Go to East Texas, Explained, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 18, 2015, 11:37 AM), http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2015/08/why-patent-trolls-go-to-east-texas-explained/ [https://perma.cc/
6TSQ-WWX2] (citing the reluctance of the judges to grant summary judgment awards as
one of the plaintiff-favorable factors); Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Why Do Patent Trolls
Go to Texas? It’s Not for the BBQ, E LECTRONIC F RONTIER F OUND . (July 9, 2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/why-do-patent-trolls-go-texas-its-not-bbq [https://perma.
cc/L9TN-97HE] (“[T]he defendants were denied the opportunity to have the judge rule on
summary judgment on [meritless lawsuits].”).
20. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 17, at 251–54 (suggesting the hostility to summary
judgment is advantageous to patent plaintiffs because juries are more sympathetic to patent
rights; thus, proceeding to a jury trial is more likely to favor patent owners).
21. See Love & Yoon, supra note 10, at 4 (“[T]here may well be no simple fix,
apart from venue reform, that will end the Eastern District of Texas’s popularity with
patent plaintiffs.”); see also Steffy, supra note 3 (“[The handling of patent cases at the
Eastern District] will continue until the bar decides to file elsewhere or until Congress
changes the law.”). In his 2014 State of the Union address, President Barack Obama also
urged for patent reform legislation. Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/presidentbarack-obamas-state-union-address [https://perma.cc/349C-QWNK] (“[L]et’s pass a patent
reform bill that allows our business to stay focused on innovation, not costly, needless
litigation.”).

188

XING (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 55: 183, 2018]

8/7/2018 10:25 AM

VENUE Act and Venue in ANDA Litigation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

A. A Blast from the Past: Pre-1988 Old Law
Prior to 1988, the general venue statute, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),
broadly defined a corporation’s residence for venue purposes to include
“any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business
or is doing business . . . .”22 Meanwhile, the specific venue law, codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), provided that “[a]ny civil action for patent
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant
resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and
has a regular and established place of business.”23 Given that the two venue
statutes would yield different results, the issue was whether the specific venue
statute of §1400(b) operated independently from the general definition of
venue as established in § 1391(c). If the courts were to interpret § 1400(b)
as independent of § 1391(c), then § 1400(b) would be the sole authority
governing venue in patent infringement cases.
The Supreme Court addressed this confusion in Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Products Corp.24 The Court interpreted the patent venue statute
narrowly and held that the more general venue § 1391(c) could not be used
to expand venue beyond what was defined in § 1400(b), which specifically
addressed venue in patent cases.25 Further, the Court held that the language
“where the defendant resides” in § 1400(b) was limited to “the state of
incorporation only.”26 The Supreme Court reiterated this position in
Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., refusing to read
§ 1391(c) into § 1400(b).27 Therefore, under the pre-1988 Supreme Court
interpretation of patent venue law, venue was significantly limited to where
the accused infringers resided or had an established place of business. The
remote, small town of the Marshall, Texas would not have been able to
attract significant numbers of patent case filings for this reason.28

22. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). The text of section 1400(b) has remained the same.
24. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
25. Id. (“We hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) . . . is the sole and exclusive provision
controlling venue in patent infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) . . . .”).
26. Id. at 226.
27. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972)
(“Congress placed patent infringement cases in a class by themselves, outside the scope of
general venue legislation.”).
28. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Venue at the Supreme Court: Correcting a 26 Year
Old Legal Error, PATENTLYO (Sept. 14, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/09/patent-
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B. The Turning Point to Nationwide Venue: The 1988 Amendment
The 1988 congressional amendment to § 1391(c) signified the transition
to broad venue law, which ultimately paved the way for forum shopping
in patent cases.29 In 1988, Congress amended § 1391(c), which governed
venue generally, to provide: “For purposes of venue under this chapter,
a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial
district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced.”30 By the language “[f]or purposes of venue under this
chapter,” did Congress intend for § 1391(c) to govern venue in all cases,
including patent cases, where the defendant was a corporation? In VE
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., the Federal Circuit answered
this question in the affirmative. 31 The Federal Circuit interpreted this
Congressional amendment to the general venue statute § 1391(c) as implicitly
overruling Fourco Glass, concluding that this amendment redefined and
expanded the corporate residence in the specific patent venue provision
§ 1400(b).32 The court reasoned that, because § 1391(c) and § 1400(b) were
both under chapter 87 of title 28, by clear language, § 1391(c) would apply
to § 1400(b).33 Accordingly, under the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of
the 1988 amendment, the proper test for venue with respect to a corporate
defendant was “whether the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction
in the district of suit at the time the action was commenced.”34
supreme-correcting.html [https://perma.cc/YSE2-U9HY] (“[F]ew patent infringement
defendants actually reside or have a place of business in the E.D. Texas.”).
29. William C. Rooklidge & Reneé L. Stasio, Venue in Patent Litigation: The Unintended
Consequences of Reform, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., no. 3, Mar. 2008, at 1–2.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
31. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1575, 1580–
81 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
32. Id. at 1579. The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the 1988 congressional
amendment was propelled by the need to clarify when a defendant corporation was amenable
to federal jurisdiction in a state having multiple judicial districts, and that there was a lack
of express legislative history indicating that the 1988 amendment of § 1391(c) was
intended to change the scope of venue in patent infringement cases. Id. at 1578.
33. Id. at 1580 (“Section 1391(c) applies to all of chapter 87 of title 28, and thus to
§ 1400(b), as expressed by the words ‘For purposes of venue under this chapter.’”). Further,
the court reasoned that if Congress had intended for section 1400(b) to be excepted from
section 1391(c), “Congress could readily have added ‘except for section 1400(b).’” Id. at
1579.
34. Id. at 1584. In Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558,
1565–69 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the Federal Circuit held that personal jurisdiction was proper if
the accused products were sold in the forum state, whether those sales were made directly
by the alleged infringer or through established distribution networks. See also Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining
the minimum contacts requirement was met where a defendant contracted with a network
of independent wholesalers and distributors to market the accused product in Delaware,
the forum state). In Beverly Hills, the Federal Circuit adopted the analysis under specific
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As a result of the broad venue law interpreted by the Federal Circuit in
VE Holding, patent holders could virtually file an infringement suit in any
district of the country because most corporate defendants sold products
nationwide, and sales of infringing products in the forum state satisfied
personal jurisdiction.35 This is true even in forums where neither the patent
owner nor the alleged infringer had a substantial presence.36 Over the years,
the broad venue law has given rise to forum shopping and the busy patent
docket at the Eastern District of Texas, the problem that plagues our patent
system. Therefore, to end the popularity of the Eastern District, curtail forum
shopping in patent cases, and restore venue in accordance with judicial
economy, a change to the nationwide venue tradition was needed.
C. A Beacon of Hope: The 2011 Amendment
VE Holding was the controlling law until 2011, when Congress amended
the general venue statute § 1391(c) again.37 Congress repealed the 1988
preamble language, “For purposes of venue under this chapter,” and added
a new subparagraph (a) headed “Applicability of Section.”38 The current
subsection 1391(a) states: “Except as otherwise provided by law—(1) this
section shall govern the venue of all civil actions brought in district courts
of the United States . . . .”39 And the current subsection 1391(c) states: “For
all venue purposes . . . an entity . . . shall be deemed to reside . . . in any judicial
district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction

personal jurisdiction delineated in the Supreme Court trilogy: International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980), and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). See 21 F.3d at 1565.
35. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 17, at 248 (“Because most accused infringers are
corporations whose products are sold nationwide, most patent plaintiffs can sue in any
district.”).
36. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 17, at 247 (“Due to weak personal jurisdiction
and venue constraints, a patentee can usually ‘choose to initiate a lawsuit in virtually any
federal district court.’” (quoting Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.,
1444, 1451 (2010))); Rogers, supra note 15 (“[P]atent holders can often file their lawsuit
at any district court in the country, even if neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is based
there.”).
37. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–
63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758, 763 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011)).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2011).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
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with respect to the civil action in question . . . .”40 The 2011 amendment
spurred patent law practitioners to revisit the decade old question: Is the
specific venue § 1400(b) the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in
patent cases, or does the general venue statute § 1391(c) supplement
1400(b)? In other words, does the language “[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by law” in § 1391(a) operate to carve out the class of patent cases from the
general venue statute § 1391(c) because the specific venue statute § 1400(b)
exists?41
Given the ambiguity in the 2011 amendment to the general venue statute,
it was too tempting for patent litigators not to challenge the VE Holding
judicial interpretation of the venue law. Such was the backdrop for the
significant case TC Heartland42—the much anticipated and most recent
Supreme Court interpretation of the venue law since the 2011 statutory
amendment. Would the Supreme Court reverse the nationwide venue tradition
and restore proper venue in patent cases?
IV. A NEW LANDSCAPE: TC HEARTLAND
TC Heartland delivers a hard-fought win for patent practitioners in the
battle to end nationwide venue. The case originated at the District Court
for Delaware.43 The plaintiff-patentee, Kraft Foods, was a Delaware company
with its principle place of business in Illinois.44 The defendant-alleged
infringer, Heartland, was an Indiana business headquartered in Indiana.45
Kraft brought a patent infringement suit in Delaware because Heartland
40. Id. § 1391(c) (2011). As such, the 2011 amended general venue statute reads
effectively similar to, but not the same as, the pre-1988 venue law. See Chien & Risch,
supra note 12.
41. Before TC Heartland, the Supreme Court had not affirmatively answered the
question but nonetheless expressed an intention to read § 1391 to give way to §1400 in
patent cases. Cf. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571
U.S. 49, 55 n.2 (2013) (“Section 1391 governs ‘venue generally,’ that is, in cases where a
more specific venue provision does not apply. [See for example,] § 1400 (identifying
proper venue for copyright and patent suits).”) (citation omitted).
42. TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
43. See Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015
WL 4778828, at*1 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2015).
44. Id.
45. Id. According to the parties’ briefs, “Heartland develop[ed], test[ed] and
manufacture[d] the accused ‘liquid water enhancer products’ . . . at facilities in both Carmel and
Indianapolis, Indiana. [Heartland was] ‘not registered to do business in Delaware and
ha[d] no office, property, employees, agents, distributors, bank accounts, or other local
presence in Delaware.’ [In addition, Heartland had] not entered into any supply contracts
in Delaware and [did] not call on any accounts in Delaware to solicit sales. [However,]
Heartland [did]. . . ship orders of the accused products directly to Delaware under contracts
with ‘two national accounts’ that were headquartered outside of Delaware.” Id. (citations
omitted).
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had shipped accused products to Delaware under contract, which accounted
for 2% of its 2013 revenue.46 After the district court denied Heartland’s
motion to dismiss or transfer venue for lack of personal jurisdiction, Heartland
filed for a writ of mandamus in the Federal Circuit, arguing that Congress’
2011 amendment to § 1391 reversed VE Holding and required narrower
interpretation of the venue law.47
Specifically, Heartland advanced three arguments based on the 2011
amendment to the general venue statute § 1391. First, Heartland argued
that the language in § 1391(a), “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,”
encompassed the patent specific venue statute § 1400(b).48 As a result,
Heartland contended that § 1391(c) would not apply in patent cases because
§ 1400(b) would govern.49 Second, Heartland argued that by adding
subsection (a) to § 1391 while broadening subsection (c) of the statute,
Congress intended to apply subsection 1391(c) as a general default venue
rule, subject to the limitation set forth in subsection 1391(a).50 Finally,
Heartland urged the Federal Circuit to reinstate Supreme Court precedents
of Fourco Glass and Brunette and reverse VE Holding because it “ha[d]
produced enormous venue shopping opportunities in patent infringement
actions . . . .”51
On April 29, 2016, the Federal Circuit delivered a disappointing opinion to
patent practitioners who had hoped for a groundbreaking reform in venue
law. The court rejected all of Heartland’s arguments and upheld the broad
venue law in VE Holding, irrespective of the 2011 congressional amendments.52
The Federal Circuit also rejected the argument that Congress intended for
subsection 1391(a)’s language, “Except as otherwise provided by law,” to
make subsection 1391(c) inapplicable in patent cases.53 The court noted
46. Id.; In re TC Heartland, LLC., 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016), rev’d 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
47. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 6–7, In re TC Heartland, LLC, 821 F.3d 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 14-028).
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. (citing to a footnote in the Supreme Court case Atlantic Marine, where the
Court implied § 1391 would not govern venue in patent cases); see also supra note 41.
50. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 47, at 7.
51. Id. at 9. Heartland specifically referenced the disproportionately large number
of patent case filings at the Eastern District of Texas and urged the Court to prevent the
abusive forum shopping practice. Id. at 9–10.
52. In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1341 (showing the court failed to cite to any
legislative history suggesting Congress amended § 1391 with the intent of limiting or
extending its application in patent infringement cases).
53. Id. at 1341–43.
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that the patent specific venue statute § 1400(b) itself does not define corporate
residence, and thus § 1400(b) would not render § 1391(c)’s definition of
corporate residence inapplicable to venue in patent cases.54 In conclusion,
the Federal Circuit refused to reinstate Fourco Glass and the pre-1988
venue law.55
Many patent practitioners were greatly disappointed by the Federal
Circuit ruling and its implications.56 As obvious from this holding, the
Federal Circuit did not bring about the major shake-up of patent venue law
many had hoped for, and it would not solve the problem of the concentration
of patent cases in plaintiff-friendly districts.57 Several district courts followed
suit and decided venue was proper based on the defendant’s sales of the
allegedly infringing products in the forum state, even when the sales in
that state only accounted for a small percentage of the national sales.58

54. Id. at 1342 (“[Although § 1400] is a specific venue provision pertaining to
patent infringement suits. . . . § 1400(b) [only] states that venue is appropriate for a patent
infringement suit ‘where the defendant resides’ without defining what ‘resides’ means
when the defendant is a corporation.”). The court further rejected Heartland’s argument
that federal common law—as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass—also
fits under the § 1931(a) exception, reasoning that VE Holding had already declared Fourco
Glass overruled by the 1988 Congressional amendment. Id. Therefore, § 1391(c) “expressly
reads itself into the specific statute, §1400(b),” only to the extent it defines where a corporation
resides for venue purposes in patent cases. Id. at 1342–43 (quoting VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson
Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
55. Id. at 1343. Judge Moore, who wrote the TC Heartland opinion, stated “before
and after [the 2011] amendments, in the context of considering amending the patent venue
statute, Congressional reports have repeatedly recognized that VE Holding is the prevailing
law.” Id. In support of his conclusion, Judge Moore cited several Congressional reports.
Id.; see citing H.R. REP. NO. 114-235, at 34 (2015) (stating Congress must correct the Federal
Circuit’s mistake in the VE Holding, and clarify that patent lawsuits may only be brought
in districts with some reasonable connection to the dispute by amending §1400); S. REP.
NO. 110-259, at 25 (2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 39–40 (2007)). However, the court
did not identify any contemporaneous record with the 2011 amendment that manifest “a
conscious choice to keep VE Holding as the prevailing law.” Crouch, supra note 28.
56. The Federal Circuit found the due process requirement that Heartland have
sufficient minimum contact with Delaware was met because Heartland “shipped orders of
the accused products directly to Delaware under contracts with what it characterizes as
‘two national accounts’ that are headquartered outside of Delaware.” TC Heartland, 821
F.3d at 1344. By analogy, had Kraft brought suit in any other state where Heartland
shipped and sold the accused products, venue would have been proper. If Heartland had
sales activities in Texas, the Eastern District of Texas would have been considered a proper
venue.
57. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Continues Broad Venue Allowance in
Patent Cases, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 29, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/circuit
continues-allowance.html [https://perma.cc/9SFX-RRJQ] (“An eventual win by Heartland
would result in a major shake-up of patent litigation by greatly reducing the concentration
of patent cases—especially those in the Eastern District of Texas.”).
58. See, e.g., Ford Glob. Techs., LLC v. New World Int’l, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-10394,
2016 WL 3349041, at *10–11 (E.D. Mich. June 16, 2016).
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However, on December 14, 2016, the Supreme Court granted Heartland’s
petition for certiorari and agreed to weigh in on the issue of patent venue.59
This decision injected much excitement and anticipation into patent practitioners
nationwide.60 Petitioner Heartland advanced similar arguments for a
narrowing venue law as it did before the Federal Circuit.61 Kraft argued
in its opposition that if the Supreme Court were to reverse TC Heartland
and revert to the pre-1988 patent venue regime, it would be unduly defendantcentric and would deter patent owners from filing infringement suits.62
Although Marshall, Texas does not appear in the case, it was in nature a battle
between patent owners who wanted flexibility in venue and corporations
who wished to avoid being sued in the Eastern District of Texas.63
59. In re TC Heartland, LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341).
60. The Supreme Court granting certiorari to review TC Heartland drew immediate
and widespread attention due to its potentially large ramifications for patent litigation
against corporate defendants and the fate of plaintiff-popular district courts—including the
Eastern District of Texas. Many predict the Court will reverse the Federal Circuit and
revert the broad venue rules to the pre-VE Holding era. See Brent Kendall, Supreme Court
to Hear Patent Case That Could Limit Venue Shopping, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:35
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-to-hear-patent-case-that-could-limit-venue
shopping-1481749533; see also Dennis Crouch, Goodbye E.D. Texas as a Major Patent
Venue, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 14, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/12/goodbye-patentvenue.html [https://perma.cc/6EVN-3W6Y]; Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear
Patent Venue Case Filled with Patent Reform Implications, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2016),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/14/supreme-court-patent-venue-case-patent-reformimplications/id=75751 [https://perma.cc/R6VH-VBUM].
61. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–9, TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp.
Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341).
62. Brief in Opposition at 29–30, TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (No. 16-341).
Kraft also noted this case is a bad vehicle for the high court to decide the patent venue
issue because Kraft actually practices the patented inventions and is not the kind of abusive
patent litigant that concerns the business community. Id. at 33. Furthermore, Kraft did
not sue in Texas but in the jurisdiction where Kraft is incorporated and suffered injury and
where Heartland purposefully directed sales of its allegedly infringing products. Id.
63. Numerous amici curiae briefs were filed before the Supreme Court. For
example, Whirlpool, a leading international appliance innovator and manufacturer, filed
an amicus brief supporting Kraft in this case, in which it also argued that a reversion back
to Fourco Glass would force corporations like Whirlpool to bring patent infringement
cases in the home court of the patent infringer and that any venue reform should come
from Congress, not the courts. Brief of Amicus Curiae Whirlpool Corp. in Support of
Respondent, TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (No. 16-341); see also, Gene Quinn, Whirlpool
Files Supreme Court Amicus Supporting Kraft Foods in TC Heartland Case, IPWATCHDOG
(Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/03/08/whirlpool-supreme-court-amicus-kraft
foods-tc-heartland/id=79303/ [https://perma.cc/KV88-CY4T] (commenting on Whirlpool’s
amicus brief).
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On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court issued a straightforward opinion
that expansively changed the venue landscape in the patent world. In reversing
the Federal Circuit, the High Court gave the final word that § 1400(b) is
the exclusive venue statute in patent cases.64 Reversing the venue law to
the Fourco Glass interpretation, the Supreme Court held that a domestic
corporation resides only in its state of incorporation for purposes of the
patent venue.65 The 2011 Congressional amendment to the general venue
statute § 1391 did not manifest a legislative intent to “alter the meaning of
§ 1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco” or ratify the Federal Circuit’s interpretation
of venue in VE Holding.66 Thus, the Supreme Court effectively discarded
a century of Federal Circuit precedent that allowed companies to be sued
for patent infringement effectively anywhere they made sales.
The Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland swiftly changed the
patent litigation map. Delaware—the most popular state of incorporation
for the majority of US companies—soon saw patent suits spike, while the
traditionally plaintiff-friendly Eastern District of Texas saw cases dwindle,
either in the form of new filings or pending cases transferring out of the
district.67 Does it mean that Marshall, Texas is no longer able to attract

64. TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1518 (“[Congress] placed patent infringement cases
in a class by themselves, outside the scope of general venue legislation.”) (citing Brunette
Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972)).
65. Id. at 1517 (“We conclude that the amendments to § 1391 did not modify the
meaning of § 1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco. We therefore hold that a domestic
corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue
statute.”). To note, however, the Supreme Court’s decision still left some questions unanswered.
See id. at 1520 n.2. First, where is venue proper for foreign corporations? Would the
general venue statute § 1391 apply to foreign corporations? Second, if multiple domestic
corporate defendants are infringing the plaintiff’s patents, and they are incorporated in
different states, would the plaintiff have to bring multiple suits in each of the defendants’
resident states? See Neonatal Prod. Grp., Inc. v. Shields, No. 13-2601-DDC-KGS, 2017
WL 3116686, at *4 (D. Kan. July 20, 2017).
66. TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21. The Supreme Court also engaged in a historical
review of the patent specific venue statute § 1400(b) to determine what the word “resides”
means. Id. at 1518–19.
67. See Ryan Davis, TC Heartland Is Already Remaking the Patent Litigation Map,
LAW360 (July 5, 2017, 5:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/california/articles/940341?utm
_source=shared-articles&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles [https://perma.
cc/M3RT-2SD8]. The article also reported “a noticeable impact on the Northern District
of California, which is home to many tech companies that are often involved in patent
litigation.” Id. Most recent statistics also show a significant decline in case filings in the
Eastern District of Texas, correlating strongly with the Supreme Court’s decision in
TC Heartland. See id. Meanwhile, “the District of Delaware (D. Del.) has been the main
beneficiary . . . .” Steve Brachmann, Lex Machina’s Q2 Litigation Update Shows Trends
Influenced by TC Heartland and Oil States, IPWATCHDOG (July 27, 2017), http://www.
ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/27/lex-machinas-q2-litigation-update-shows-trends-influenced-tc
heartland-oil-states/id=86095/ [https://perma.cc/4EY7-P2BD].

196

XING (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 55: 183, 2018]

8/7/2018 10:25 AM

VENUE Act and Venue in ANDA Litigation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

patent owners to bring infringement cases?68 Well, not quite.69 Section
1400(b) lays out a two-prong test for patent venue.70 The first prong is the
defendant’s residence, which, under TC Heartland, is the state of incorporation
for a corporate defendant.71 The second prong is “where the defendant
has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place
of business.”72 Because very limited case law exists regarding the second
prong, a “renewed emphasis” has been placed on it.73
Eastern District of Texas Judge Rodney Gilstrap, the most experienced
patent judge in the country74, took a broad view of what constituted “a
regular and established place of business” in a recent decision.75 In denying
a motion to transfer under the new venue standard in TC Heartland, Judge
Gilstrap set a four-factor test to determine whether a company had a regular
and established place of business in the district: (1) whether “a defendant
has a physical presence in the district”, including retail stores and warehouses;
(2) whether “a defendant represents . . . that it has a presence in the district”;
(3) “the extent to which a defendant derives benefits from its presence in
the district”; and (4) “the extent to which a defendant interacts in a

68. Commentators expected TC Heartland “could significantly reduce, if not outright
eliminate, patent litigation in the collection of small cities east of Dallas.” Davis, supra
note 67.
69. As will be discussed shortly, because the Supreme Court left many questions
about venue unsettled in the TC Heartland opinion, patent owners, especially NPEs, and
judges in the Eastern District of Texas are seeking openings to keep patent infringement
suits there. See id.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Matthew Butlman, Gilstrap’s Venue Test an Encouraging Sign for Patent Owners,
LAW360 (July 6, 2017, 9:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/941916?utm_source
=shared-articles&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles [https://perma.cc/
C2UN-4XZ4] (noting patent owners are advancing new arguments emphasizing the defendants’
connections to the Eastern District of Texas, hoping it will satisfy the “regular and
established place of business” prong of § 1400(b) for patent venue).
74. Ryan Davis, Lawmakers Slam ‘Reprehensible’ New Gilstrap Venue Rules, LAW360
(July 13, 2017, 8:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/942170?utm_source=shared
articles&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles [https://perma.cc/LFG2
CPUX] (explaining Judge Gilstrap “handles by far the most patent cases in America”).
75. Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 794–99 (E.D. Tex. 2017), mandamus
granted, order vacated sub nom. In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Judge
Gilstrap noted the lack of precedent on the second prong of § 1400(b). See id. at 792.
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targeted way with” the district.76 Many believed this opinion sends
an encouraging message to patent owners to keep patent infringement
suits in the Eastern District of Texas, thus blunting the devastating TC
Heartland decision, and will result in a sizable number of cases staying in
the reputed plaintiff-friendly district.77 However, lawmakers criticized Judge
Gilstrap’s interpretation of the venue law as being inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in TC Heartland; “one congressman [even] call[ed]
the ruling ‘reprehensible.’”78 The Federal Circuit granted the plaintiff’s petition
for writ of mandamus and rejected such a broad interpretation of “regular
and established place of business.”79
TC Heartland is hardly the ideal solution for patent venue, leaving
considerable issues unsettled. On the one hand, allowing corporate infringers
to be sued only in their state of incorporation is unduly defendant-centric
and would deter patent owners from filing legitimate infringement suits.80
On the other, the ambiguity of the statutory language and limited case law
leave open significant room for plaintiff-popular districts to reinvent ways
to keep their busy patent docket.81 The courts’ inability to fill in the blank
in venue laws leaves patent practitioners one last recourse—congressional
reform of the venue laws.82 Accordingly, congressional action is necessary
to pick up where the courts left off.83 It is imperative that Congress directly
address the issue of patent venue and return basic fairness, rationality, and
balance to patent law.84 In order to balance both patent owners’ and
76. Id. at 796–99 (emphasizing that no single factor was dispositive, but a flexible
approach should be adopted to examine all the circumstances of the case).
77. E.g., Butlman, supra note 73 (“This could provide some hope to patent owners
who were hoping a broad interpretation of what it means to have a ‘place of business’
could help to blunt the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision to put limits on where
patent lawsuits can be filed.”); Davis, supra note 74.
78. Davis, supra note 74.
79. In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1364–66 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding venue was
improper in the Eastern District of Texas only because a sales executive of the defendant
corporation has a home in the district). “Three general requirements [are] relevant to the
inquiry: (1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and
established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant. If any statutory
requirement is not satisfied, venue is improper under § 1400(b).” Id. at 1360.
80. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 62, at 29–31.
81. See Davis, supra note 74.
82. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 62, at 29.
83. In TC Heartland, Kraft insisted the patent venue issue extended beyond the
scope of judicial interpretation and was one for Congress, not the courts, to decide. Id. at
29 (“Any recalibration of patent venue remains in Congress’s hands.”). Kraft also argued
the Supreme Court did not have the prerogative to overwrite Congressional intent. Id. at
33 (“However urgent the issue of patent venue reform may be, it is an issue that must be
left to Congress.”).
84. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) has stated that regardless of how the Supreme Court
decides TC Heartland, Congress will take up the issue of venue reform. Gene Quinn, Hatch

198

XING (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 55: 183, 2018]

8/7/2018 10:25 AM

VENUE Act and Venue in ANDA Litigation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

corporations’ interests, and eliminate the fundamental unfairness of forum
shopping, Congress will need to amend the statutory language to optimally
define where a suit of patent infringement can be brought against a corporate
defendant.85 Specifically, Congress must require at least one party to the
lawsuit have a substantive connection to the venue “to ensure fairness and
uniformity in patent law.”86 Moreover, Congress must strike a balance between
affording patent owners sufficient freedom to choose venue to enforce their
rights and limiting NPEs’ abuse of forum shopping for plaintiff-friendly
local rules.
V. A CONGRESSIONAL PRESCRIPTION THAT CURES THE PROBLEM—
THE VENUE ACT
The VENUE Act, introduced by Senators Jeff Flake, Mike Lee, and Cory
Gardner in March 2016, is a proposal currently before Congress that has
the potential to achieve a better patent venue framework.87 The VENUE Act
proposes to substitute the current patent specific venue statute § 1400(b)
with the following text, in relevant part:
(b) Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c) of section 1391, any civil action
for patent infringement or any action for a declaratory judgment that a
patent is invalid or not infringed may be brought only in a judicial district—
(1) where the defendant has its principal place of business or is incorporated;
(2) where the defendant has committed an act of infringement of a patent in
suit and has a regular and established physical facility that gives rise to the
act of infringement;

Says Patent Venue Reform Likely Regardless of SCOTUS Decision in TC Heartland,
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/16/hatch-venue
reform-likely-scotus-tc-heartland/id=78495/ [https://perma.cc/E5TZ-Y45N] (“I believe
there’s one area where we can see real progress this year: venue. Abusive litigants have
exploited a hole in the law to direct a disproportionate number of suits to plaintiff-friendly
forums, and to one such forum in particular. . . . [N]o matter what the [Supreme] Court
does, we’re likely going to need follow-on legislation to prevent future forum-shopping
and to ensure that litigants have a meaningful connection to the site of the suit.”).
85. Crouch, supra note 15. After the Federal Circuit issued the TC Heartland opinion,
a group of forty-five professors drafted a letter to Congress, calling for statutory reform to
limit venue in patent infringement cases and arguing “[t]he staggering concentration of
patent cases in just a few federal district courts is bad for the patent system.” Chien & Risch,
supra note 12.
86. Crouch, supra note 15.
87. See generally Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S.
2733, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s2733/BILLS-114s2733is.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PD7V-X3RY].
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(3) where the defendant has agreed or consented to be sued in the instant
action;
(4) where an inventor named on the patent in suit conducted research or
development that led to the application for the patent in suit;
(5) where a party has a regular and established physical facility that such party
controls and operates, not primarily for the purpose of creating venue,
and has—
(A) engaged in management of significant research and development
of an invention claimed in a patent in suit prior to the effective
filing date of the patent;
(B) manufactured a tangible product that is alleged to embody an invention
claimed in a patent in suit; or
(C) implemented a manufacturing process for a tangible good in which
the process is alleged to embody an invention claimed in a patent
in suit . . . .88

As seen from the preamble, drafters intended the proposed new specific
venue statute § 1400(b) as a stand-alone statute solely and exclusively
governing venue in patent cases.89 It also clarifies where venue is proper:
where the accused infringer is incorporated, has its principle place of business,
or engages in substantial infringing acts.90 This change would significantly
restrict where suits can be filed, especially eliminating plaintiff-popular
districts with no substantial ties to either party of the lawsuit, but at the
same time would afford patent owners sufficient choice in venue.91 Given
the significant benefits this proposed venue reform is expected to generate, it
has gathered support from patent law scholars and practitioners.92
However, not all legal scholars and practitioners agree with the proposed
VENUE Act. In July 2016, a “group of [forty-five] professors [penned a]
letter to Congress arguing for statutory reform[] to limit venue in patent
infringement cases.”93 Subsequently, an opposing group of twenty-eight
professors also submitted a letter to Congress urging serious caution regarding
the pending VENUE Act.94 They pressed Congress “to adopt a cautious stance

88. S. 2733 § 2.
89. See supra pp. 199–200.
90. See supra pp. 199–200.
91. This Comment will also address the shortcomings of the proposed VENUE Act,
namely, that the Act will potentially cause a shift and re-concentration of patent case filings to
states where corporate defendants are incorporated or headquartered, and that the Act is
defendant-centric and restricts patent owners’ ability to bring suit. See infra Section VII.D.
92. See, e.g., Elliot Harmon, Tell the Senate: Pass the VENUE Act, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/03/tell-senate-pass
venue-act [https://perma.cc/8HHZ-58TB] (“[The VENUE Act] would bring a modicum of
fairness to a broken patent system. . . . [by requiring] the plaintiff in a patent suit to file in
a district where it makes sense . . . .”).
93. Crouch, supra note 15.
94. For an introduction and reproduction of the letter, see Dennis Crouch, Letter to
Congress from 28 Law Professors & Economists Urging Caution on the VENUE Act,
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to enacting” the VENUE Act in the wake of the 2011 congressional
modifications of the venue statute, “at least until the effects of the recent
changes are better understood.”95 Their salient point should be well taken:
it is of great importance to understand the framework and potential effect
of the proposed act. Fortunately, one need not look far. In a specialized class
of patent infringement cases—ANDA litigation—one could find a framework
of venue laws similar to the one proposed in the VENUE Act. As such,
this Comment will assess the parallel between venue in ANDA litigation
and the proposed VENUE Act to shed light on the potential effect the
VENUE Act might have on patent venue reform.
VI. A REAL-LIFE EXAMPLE: VENUE IN ANDA LITIGATION
Like other high technology industries, the pharmaceutical industry
especially relies on patents to ensure profitability and survival.96 Because
of the enormous costs associated with research and development of a
successful new drug—from large scale compound screening, research on
promising drug candidates, animal studies, to safety and efficacy trials on
humans—adequate patent protection of the approved drug and the exclusive
right to sell are essential for pharmaceutical companies to sustain innovative
investments and shoulder the high risks of drug development.97 Often
times, pharmaceutical companies rely on the sales of a few patented blockbuster
drugs for their annual revenue and face significant revenue loss when the
patent protection expires.98 Once the patent protection on the brand name
PATENTLY-O (Aug. 1, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/08/congress-professors
economists.html [https://perma.cc/K5X4-KRKA].
95. Id.
96. Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 171 (2008).
97. Id. at 171–72. “Because the drug discovery process has a high failure rate,”
pharmaceutical companies need to rely on the few commercially successful drugs to “recoup
[the enormous costs associated with the] research and development expenses.” Id.
98. A “blockbuster drug” is a drug product having in excess of one billion U.S.
dollars in annual sales. Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic
Entry and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century After the 1984
Waxman-Hatch Legislation 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16431,
2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16431.pdf [http://www.nber.org/papers/w16431.pdf]. A
famous example is Lipitor (atorvastatin calcium), a drug developed by Pfizer to lower high
cholesterol. LIPITOR, https://www.lipitor.com/ [https://perma.cc/N5GM-PVAE] (last visited
May 14, 2018). Lipitor was the world’s best-selling medicine when it lost patent protection at
the end of 2011. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42399, DRUG PATENT
EXPIRATIONS: POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1, 9 (2012) (footnote
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drug expires, competitors can introduce generic versions of the drug into
the market, thus increasing price competition and ultimately benefiting
the public.99
A. An Overview of ANDA Litigation
The process for the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) to approve a
generic drug used to be a lengthy and expensive one, making it difficult
for generic drugs to enter the market.100 To streamline the approval process
and expedite the availability of generic drugs to patients, Congress passed
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act for the congressman and the
senator who sponsored the act.101 The act allows a generic drug manufacturer
to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA, which
significantly shortens the time to get the generic drugs to the market.102
As a compromising measure, the act also provides additional protections
to brand name companies, such as patent term extensions and restrictions
on the eligibility of generic drugs for ANDA.103 As such, ANDA litigation
omitted) (citing Jaime Thompson, Client Mgmt., IMS Health, Inc., The Use of Medicines
in the United States: Review of 2010 (May 31, 2011)), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w16431 [https://perma.cc/A3TQ-ZHCT]. Lipitor generated $3 billion in sales in 2010,
comprising 20% of Pfizer’s total revenue. Id. at 9, 11. Recently, in 2015, the sales of brand
drugs “at risk of patent expiration [constituted] $44 billion.” Tracy Staton, The Top 10
Patent Losses of 2015, FIERCEPHARMA, http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-report/top
10-patent-losses-of-2015 [https://perma.cc/RF7J-F5HT].
99. See Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Comment, Consumer Protection,
Patents and Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the HatchWaxman Act, VA. J.L. & TECH., Winter 2004, at 1, 4. A blockbuster drug falls off “the patent
cliff” when its patent protection expires. See, e.g., Charlotte Harrison, The Patent Cliff Steepens,
10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY, Jan. 2011, at 12, 12.
100. See Katherine Rhoades, Comment, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Stop for Summary
Judgment: The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware’s Seemingly Disjunctive
Yet Efficient Procedures in Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
81, 83 (2016).
101. Id.; see also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)
(2012)).
102. See Rhoades, supra note 100; see also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk
A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 404–05 (2012) (“[The ANDA] process is designed to speed the introduction
of low-cost generic drugs to market.”).
103. Caraco, 566 U.S. at 405. The Hatch-Waxman Act attempted “to balance the
need for innovative new drugs and increased availability of less expensive generic products”
by facilitating “the marketing of generic drugs while permitting brand name companies to
recover a portion of their intellectual property rights lost during the pharmaceutical approval
process.” WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42399, DRUG PATENT EXPIRATIONS:
POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 1, 7 (2012) (listing legislative provisions
in the Hatch-Waxman Act that afford additional patent protection to brand name
pharmaceutical companies).
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is a special kind of patent law as it closely relates to drug law that governs
the administrative process of approving a generic drug.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, as codified in § 271(e)(1), provides a safeharbor for the using and selling of patent-protected products reasonably
related to the research and development of a generic drug.104 However,
such safe-harbor exemption is removed once the generic drug developer
submits an application for approval to the FDA, at which point the activity
becomes infringing under § 271(e)(2) if the brand name version of the
same drug is patent-protected.105 In order to file an ANDA to the FDA,
generic manufacturers must include one of four listed certifications, commonly
known as paragraph I-IV certifications: “(i) that such patent information
has not been filed, (ii) that such patent has expired, (iii) of the date on which
such patent will expire, or (iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted . . . .”106 Disputes between a generic manufacturer and
the brand name pharmaceutical company regarding patent rights arise
when paragraph IV certifications are implicated, in which the ANDA
applicant is certifying that the patent claiming the brand name drug is either
invalid or that the generic drug will not infringe the patent.107 Accordingly, a
paragraph IV certification is effectively an invitation to patent litigation.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a recourse for brand name companies
to file a suit of patent infringement against potential generic manufacturers in
a federal district court.108 Meanwhile, manufacturers intending to clear
104. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make,
use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.”).
105. Id. § 271(e)(2).
106. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (2012).
107. Id.; Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, 4 INNOVATION POL’Y
& ECON. 145, 149 (2004).
108. See Bulow, supra note 107, at 149–50 (asserting that if the patent holder files
an infringement suit within forty-five days of the paragraph IV certification notification,
the FDA approval of the generic ANDA is stayed until the earliest of: (1) patent expiration,
(2) court resolution of the infringement issue, or (3) thirty months from the time of the
notification,); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012). Like general patent infringement
suits, venue in ANDA litigation is governed by § 1391 and § 1400(b). See AstraZeneca,
LP v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 08-453-GMS, 2011 WL 2516381, at *2 (D. Del. June 23, 2011)
(“Venue is proper in this court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1400(b).”). However, because
of differences between ANDA and general patent litigation, the personal jurisdictional
analysis and the resulting filing statistics are quite different. See infra pp. 212–15.
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the path for marketing a generic drug can bring a suit of declaratory judgment
alleging invalidity of patents held by brand name companies.109 If the
generic manufacturer succeeds at proving either patent invalidity or noninfringement, the approval of the ANDA will permit the generic drug to
enter the market.110
B. ANDA Litigation Filings
Since 2009, the majority of ANDA litigation overwhelmingly took
place in two United States districts—the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware and the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey.111 Between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2015, a total
of 2,249 ANDA cases were filed nationwide, with 911 cases filed in Delaware,
725 cases filed in New Jersey, and 613 cases in all other districts combined.112
Although ANDA cases account for about 10% of all patent litigation cases
in the United States, they have quite different characteristics from general
patent cases.113 Most relevant to this Article, the concentration of ANDA
cases in Delaware and New Jersey coincides with the significant number
of pharmaceutical companies that are incorporated or headquartered in these
two states, whereas a significant majority of general patent cases are
concentrated in Texas where neither party has a substantial relation.114
109. If the patent owner does not sue the ANDA applicant within forty-five days of
receiving notice of the ANDA, the generic applicant may file a declaratory judgment action
against the patent holder “in the judicial district where the [patent owner] has its principal
place of business or a regular and established place of business.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)
(C)(II) (2012).
110. R UBEN J ACOBO -R UBIO ET AL ., T HE D ISTRIBUTION OF S URPLUS IN THE US
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: EVIDENCE FROM PARAGRAPH (IV) PATENT LITIGATION DECISIONS
2 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481908 [https://perma.cc/P9XB-E7AV] (“[The FDA]
permits generic firms to rely on brand-firm data on safety and efficacy in seeking approval
to sell copies of brand drugs, but does not grant entry unless and until the generic firm successfully
challenges all brand-firm patents covering the active ingredient and formulations of the
drug in question.”).
111. See Rhoades, supra note 100, at 83; see also Kevin E. Noonan, Lex Machina Looks
at ANDA Cases, PAT. DOCS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.patentdocs.org/2014/11/lex
machina-looks-at-anda-cases.html [https://perma.cc/9QFZ-H95W] (analyzing the report
on ANDA litigation filings released by Lex Machina).
112. Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Filings Have Risen Significantly Since 2014,
According to Lex Machina’s 2015 Hatch-Waxman/ANDA Report, LEX MACHINA (Apr. 26,
2016) [hereinafter Patent Litigation Filings], https://lexmachina.com/media/press/pharmaceuticalpatent-litigation-filings-risen-since-2014/ [https://perma.cc/P3SU-LMDQ].
113. For instance, 70.3% of ANDA cases involve a court-issued injunction for the
prevailing patentee, compared to 57.6% in non-ANDA patent cases. Noonan, supra note 111.
Additionally, only 57.9% of ANDA cases end in a settlement, compared to 77.1% in nonANDA patent cases, and 14.6% of ANDA cases are won by the claimant, compared to 4.4% in
non-ANDA patent cases. Patent Litigation Filings, supra note 112.
114. Rhoades, supra note 100, at 83.
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Therefore, compared to general patent cases, ANDA case filing better accords
with judicial economy. As this Comment will illustrate, the proposed venue
reform by the VENUE Act will optimize venue in general patent litigation
to an effect similar to venue in ANDA litigation.
One may wonder as to the contrast between ANDA cases and general
patent cases in terms of distribution among district courts, given that both
types of patent infringement cases are subject to the same venue rules.115
However, one key difference is that in general non-ANDA patent infringement
cases, the corporate defendant is usually selling the accused products nationwide,
thus satisfying personal jurisdiction in practically every state of the country.
Conversely, in ANDA cases, the allegedly infringing generic drug has yet
to enter the market, and none of the infringing activities—namely, manufacture,
use, or sale of the generic drug—has occurred.116 Instead, the statute creates
“a highly artificial act of infringement that consists of submitting an ANDA”
to the FDA.117 Given such distinction, the courts have shaped a quite different
landscape in terms of proper forum in ANDA cases, which in effect parallels
the proposed venue reform by the VENUE Act.
C. Proper Forum Through Specific Jurisdiction
There are two ways to establish proper forum in ANDA cases—by specific
jurisdiction or by general jurisdiction.118 Constitutional “due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
115. After TC Heartland, district courts apply the same venue analysis under
§ 1400(b) to ANDA litigation. See, e.g., Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc.,
No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017). However, ANDA
litigation presents unique personal jurisdictional issues that are distinct from those in
general patent litigation. In the end, the limitations imposed by personal jurisdiction
requirements in ANDA cases are analogous to those imposed by the venue law in general
patent litigation, even though they are two separate legal concepts. To distinguish the concepts,
this Comment will refer to “forum” when discussing the personal jurisdictional analysis
in ANDA cases and “venue” when discussing general patent litigation.
116. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990).
117. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012).
118. See Eric H. Weisblatt & Claire Frezza, Who to Sue and Where in ANDA Litigation:
Personal Jurisdiction Post-Daimler, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 352, 355 (2014). Because
this Comment focuses on corporate defendants—and venue is proper in any district of a
multidistrict state if the corporate defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in that state
at the time the action is commenced—the terms “venue” and “personal jurisdiction” are
equivalent for this part of the analysis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2012).
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‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”119 The doctrine
has split into two categories: specific and general jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court most recently reiterated the concept of specific jurisdiction in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.120 Specific jurisdiction “depends
on an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,’
principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State
and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”121 Thus, specific jurisdiction
permits a plaintiff to sue a defendant in a forum state where the defendant’s
conduct that gave rise to the suit took place.
In ANDA cases, however, as a statutory creation, the infringing act is
submitting an ANDA itself.122 In the absence of “making, using, or selling
a patented technology, infringement under § 271(e)(2) has no readily apparent
situs of injury for the purpose of finding specific jurisdiction.”123 Accordingly,
courts traditionally have difficulty in exercising specific jurisdiction over
generic drug company defendants in ANDA cases because of insufficient
contact between the defendants and the forum state.124 Adding to the difficulty
in finding specific jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has held that although
the FDA is located in Rockville, Maryland, an ANDA with the FDA by
itself does not constitute a jurisdictional contact with Maryland.125 To hold
otherwise “would allow for the creation of a national judicial forum in
Maryland for generic drug infringement cases.”126 Several courts also have
held that the intention to sell generic drugs in a state after FDA approval is
not sufficient to be sued for patent infringement in that state.127
119. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
120. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
121. Id. (citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)).
122. See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 558 (D. Del.
2014).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule
Patent Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 409, 420 (D. Del. 2010) (finding defendant’s contact with
the forum state insufficient to satisfy specific jurisdiction because the contact does “not
relate to the patent infringement action” in suit); Glaxo, Inc. v. Genpharm Pharm., Inc., 796 F.
Supp. 872, 875–76 (E.D.N.C. 1992) (finding defendant’s contact with the forum state
“virtually non-existent” because defendant does not solicit business, hold an office, hold
a license to do business, manufacture, distribute, or sell products in the state).
125.
See Zeneca, Ltd. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 173 F.3d 829, 829, 831 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“[E]ntry into the District of Columbia by nonresidents for the purpose of contacting federal
governmental agencies is not a basis for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction.” (quoting
Environmental Research Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813
(D.C. 1976) (en banc))).
126. See id. at 832.
127. Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 118, at 352–53; see, e.g., Intendis, Inc. v. River’s
Edge Pharm., LLC, No. 11–2838(FSH)(PS), 2011 WL 5513195, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 10, 2011)
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Conversely, specific jurisdiction has been found in a limited number of
forums including the state in which the ANDA is prepared and the state
in which the generic drug is tested or developed.128 Thus, even though
§ 271(e) makes the submission of the ANDA—not the preparation of the
ANDA—an act of patent infringement, the courts have rejected this artificial
distinction and held that it is the work undertaken by generic drug companies
in preparation for the ANDA filing that constitutes jurisdictional contact
with the forum state.129 As a result, courts have traditionally limited specific
jurisdiction to forum states where the generic drug is developed, tested, or
prepared for the ANDA filing.130 This approach differs from non-ANDA
patent cases, where specific jurisdiction is easily satisfied by actual sale
activity of the allegedly infringing products.131 This difference in judicial
interpretation of the venue law, in turn, largely accounts for the prominent
forum shopping in general patent cases, which is absent in ANDA cases.132
D. Proper Forum Through General Jurisdiction
Unlike specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction does not require that
the cause of action arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum state.133 “A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign
(“[T]he only New Jersey connection claimed by Plaintiff is that Defendant plans to sell
the product in New Jersey—which, Defendant points out, hasn’t happened yet.”).
128. See Intendis, 2011 WL 5513195, at *4; Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 08-CV
00984-LDD, 2009 WL 2843288, at *3 n.5 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2009) (“[W]e find more
significant the location of the operative facts—the preparation and submission of the
ANDA—giving rise to this action.”); Pfizer, Inc. v. Synthon Holding, B.V., 386 F. Supp.
2d 666, 674–75 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (holding that patent infringement claim stemming from
filing of ANDA arose where ANDA was prepared and submitted); Bristol–Meyers Squibb
Co. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, No. 03 Civ. 2503(SHS), 2003 WL 22888804, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 2003) (holding that location of design and development is location of operative
facts in ANDA infringement case).
129. See, e.g., Synthon Holding, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 675–76.
130. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., New World Int’l, Inc., v. Ford Glob. Techs., LLC, 859 F.3d 1032, 1039
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
132. For a general discussion on how the current judicial interpretation of venue law
leads to forum shopping in general patent cases, see Vasiliy Mayer, Forum Shopping in
Patent Litigation, FISH & RICHARDSON (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.fr.com/fish-litigation/
forum-shopping-patent-lit/ [https://perma.cc/CTG6-NJ87].
133. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9
(1984) (“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising
out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be
exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”).
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(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims
against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”134
In ANDA cases, courts have historically asserted general personal jurisdiction
over generic drug company defendants based on their conduct in the state,
including a history of business solicitation, substantial past sales, revenue
generated in the forums, submission to previous lawsuits, and assignments
of agents to accept service of process.135
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman,136
however, the exercise of general jurisdiction has become harder to satisfy.
In Daimler, the Supreme Court elaborated on its previous decision in
Goodyear and explained that only in a limited set of circumstances will a
corporate defendant be “at home” and amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction in
a forum state: “With respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and
principal place of business are ‘paradigm . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’”137
Although the Court did not specify a formulation for principle place of
business, it is a high standard to meet.138 Further, the Court rejected the idea
that a “State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous,

134. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)
(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). In Goodyear, the Court
notes two paradigm bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporate
defendant—the place of incorporation and the principle place of business. Id. at 924.
135. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d. 824, 830 (S.D. Ind.
2015); AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 554 (D. Del. 2014);
Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 118, at 355; see, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride
Extended-Release Capsule Patent Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 409, 421 (D. Del. 2010) (focusing on
defendant’s substantial revenue from Delaware drug sales in upholding general jurisdiction);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Mayne Pharma, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 387, 394–95 (S.D. Ind. 2007)
(focusing on the defendant’s regular business solicitation and distribution of substantial
quantities of pharmaceuticals in Indiana as well as substantial revenues from those sales);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sicor Pharm., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-238-SEB-JMS, 2007 WL 1245882, at
*7 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2007); Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 05-6561, 2006 WL
850916, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2006).
136. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
137. Id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924).
138. One of the few Supreme Court precedents on point is Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). The defendant in Perkins was a company incorporated
in the Philippines. Id. at 439. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World
War II, the company ceased its mining operations in the Philippines and moved to Ohio,
where the president kept an office, maintained the company’s files, and oversaw the
company’s activities. Id. at 447–48. The Court “held that the Ohio courts could exercise
general jurisdiction over Benguet . . . because ‘Ohio was the corporation’s principal, if
temporary, place of business.’” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 129 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.11 (1984)).
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and systematic course of business” can exert general jurisdiction over the
corporation.139
After Daimler, in adopting this narrowing application of general jurisdiction
in ANDA cases, some courts have held that the defendant company’s
contacts with the forum state, which would have been found sufficient for
the exercise of general jurisdiction in the past, were insufficient in light of
the Daimler standard.140 Accordingly, since Daimler, the courts are limited
to find general jurisdiction only in a corporate defendant’s place of
incorporation or principle place of business.
E. New Development in Specific Jurisdiction
At first glance, Daimler significantly restricted choice of forum in which
an ANDA case may be brought. Interestingly, however, the narrowing of
general jurisdiction by Daimler has spurred a new, broadening development
in specific jurisdiction. As previously discussed, specific jurisdiction in
ANDA cases has been traditionally limited to forum states where the generic
drug is developed, tested, or prepared for the ANDA filing.141 However,
the Federal Circuit issued the opinion of Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. shortly before the same court issued TC Heartland
and unprecedentedly expanded the application of specific jurisdiction in
ANDA cases.142 In Acorda Therapeutics, the plaintiffs were brand name
drug companies who brought suit under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) against generic
manufacturer, Mylan, alleging patent infringement by drugs that Mylan
had sought FDA permission to manufacture and market in Delaware.143
Mylan appealed from the district court’s denial of motion to dismiss for

139. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 (citation omitted) (“That formulation, we hold, is
unacceptably grasping.”).
140. See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 96 F. Supp. 3d. at 830 (finding “[t]he Supreme Court’s recent
decision in [Daimler has] altered the analysis with respect to general jurisdiction such that
the” factors on which courts have traditionally focused in ANDA cases—a history of
business solicitation and substantial past sales and revenue generated in the forum—are no
longer sufficient in most cases without more to support an exercise of general jurisdiction);
AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 554 (“AstraZeneca has failed to allege contacts sufficient
to render Mylan at home in Delaware, in light of Daimler.”).
141. See supra Section VI.C.
142. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 764 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Acorda Therapeutics involved two parallel cases appealed from the District of
Delaware. See Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 593–
95 (D. Del. 2015); AstraZeneca AB, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 558–60.
143. Acorda Therapeutics, 817 F.3d at 757.
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lack of personal jurisdiction.144 The sole issue for the Federal Circuit to
address was whether Daimler affected the analysis of specific jurisdiction
in ANDA cases.145 The Federal Circuit concluded that specific jurisdiction
was proper based on Mylan’s suit-related contacts with Delaware.146 Because
Mylan took the costly, significant step of applying for FDA approval to
engage in future activities—including the marketing of its generic drugs—
that would be purposefully directed at Delaware, the minimum-contacts
standard underlying specific jurisdiction analysis was satisfied.147 In other
words, Mylan’s ANDA filing for the purpose of engaging in allegedly wrongful
marketing conduct in Delaware constituted substantial connection with
Delaware.148
The Federal Circuit’s specific jurisdiction analysis in Acorda Therapeutics
deviated from the traditional, more limited approach in ANDA cases.149
The Federal Circuit’s broadening approach of specific jurisdiction exposes
generic drug companies to the possibility of being sued in any district that
they intend to market the generic drug, thus opening the door to forum
shopping for plaintiff-favorable courts.150 However, Acorda Therapeutics
is a recent decision whose effect on ANDA case filings remains to be seen.151

144. Id. “Mylan is incorporated in West Virginia and has its principal place of
business there. Mylan submitted its ANDAs to the FDA in Maryland, and it did much if
not all of its preparation of its ANDA filings in West Virginia. . . . Mylan has registered
to do business and appointed an agent to accept service in Delaware. And, of particular
importance, Mylan intends to direct sales of its drugs into Delaware, among other places,
once it has the requested FDA approval to market them.” Id. at 758. Based on these facts,
Mylan contended Delaware could not exercise personal jurisdiction over it, either under
specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction analysis. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 759–60.
148. Id. at 760. The court also noted that Mylan undisputedly intended to market the
generic drug elsewhere following FDA approval, implying that, for the same reasons,
specific jurisdiction would be proper in other states as well. Id. at 759.
149. Traditionally, the courts have held that the intention to sell generic drugs in a
state upon FDA approval is insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in that state. See
supra note 127 and accompanying text. Instead, the courts limit contacts sufficient for the
exercise of specific jurisdiction to generic manufacturers’ preparation for the ANDA. See
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
150. See Dennis Crouch, ANDA Filing Creates Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 18, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/03/nationwide-personal
jurisdiction.html [https://perma.cc/XM59-9YQC].
151. Currently, the venue law in ANDA litigation is still in accordance with judicial
economy, and forum shopping in ANDA cases is not as prominent as in general patent
litigation. See Patent Litigation Filings, supra note 112. As introduced previously, ANDA
cases heavily concentrate in Delaware and New Jersey, where a significant number
of pharmaceutical companies are incorporated or headquartered. See Rhoades, supra note
100, at 83. According to Patent Litigation Filings, supra note 112, from 2009 to 2015, Delaware
and New Jersey handled 911 and 725 ANDA cases, respectively, whereas the Eastern District
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Nonetheless, the trend of broad interpretation of venue is alarming. If
uncurbed, it will afford significant latitude to patent holders to bring
infringement suits in states that do not have a substantial tie and forum
shopping will become commonplace. Thus, the trend makes venue reform
even more urgent and necessary.
VII. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE VENUE ACT AND
ANDA LITIGATION
When Senate legislators introduced the VENUE Act in March 2016,
they aimed to “ensure that venue in patents cases is fair and proper” by
restricting permissible venue where a case of patent infringement may be
brought and to ameliorate the concentration of filings at the Eastern District
of Texas, especially those initiated by NPEs.152 Intended as a stand-alone
statute governing venue in patent cases, the VENUE Act modifies 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) as to establish proper venue only if enumerated circumstances
are met.153
The similarities between the proposed VENUE Act and the jurisdictional
scheme in ANDA cases are abundant, which makes ANDA litigation a
valuable guide that Congress could draw lessons from when considering
the VENUE Act. Therefore, a side-by-side comparison of the VENUE Act
and ANDA jurisdictional law is helpful. Generally, the VENUE Act proposes
to establish venue through two major categories: by the defendant’s residence
at the forum state; or by the occurrence of infringing acts or preparation
for the infringing products at the forum state.154 The two categories also

of Texas handled only thirty-eight, Steve Brachmann, Lex Machina ANDA Litigation
Report Shows Recent Decline in Case Filings and Top Parties in Filings, IP WATCHDOG
(May 8, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/08/anda-litigation-report-shows
decline-case-filings/id=82930/ [https://perma.cc/V59U-X82G].
152. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th
Cong. (2016); see Love & Yoon, supra note 10, at 3 (“[The VENUE Act’s target] is crystal
clear: the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, a court made infamous as
the location of choice for America’s ‘patent trolls,’ companies formed solely for the purpose of
monetizing patent rights through litigation . . . .”).
153. S. 2733, § 2(a). For a complete quotation of the relevant language of the VENUE
Act, see supra pp. 199–200.
154. See S. 2733, § 2. To note, the VENUE Act also provides for venue by the defendant’s
consent, which will not be discussed in this Comment.
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parallel the general and specific jurisdictional analysis adopted in ANDA
cases, respectively.155
A. Venue by General Jurisdiction-Sufficient Contact
First, the general jurisdiction provisions in the VENUE Act present a
clearer and simpler analytical approach. Under the VENUE Act, “any civil
action for patent infringement or any action for a declaratory judgment
that a patent is invalid or not infringed may be brought only in a judicial
district—(1) where the defendant has its principal place of business or is
incorporated . . . .”156 Accordingly, the VENUE Act preserves what is already
prescribed by the current § 1400(b)—jurisdiction can be established in a
corporate defendant’s residence state.157 The residence provision is also
equivalent to the general jurisdictional approach in ANDA cases in the
post-Daimler era, where alleged patent infringers can always be sued in
states where they are “essentially at home.”158
The VENUE Act differs from the general jurisdictional analysis in ANDA
litigation by extending venue to also include forums “where the defendant
has committed an act of infringement of a patent in suit and has a regular
and established physical facility.”159 Thus, a patent holder would have more
latitude to bring an infringement suit outside of the defendant’s residence
state. Nonetheless, this added flexibility of choice in venue is still limited—
the Act further specifies that “the dwelling or residence of an employee or
contractor of a defendant . . . shall not constitute a regular and established
physical facility.”160 This added qualification is intended to prevent NPEs
155. For detailed a discussion and case illustrations of the general and specific jurisdictional
analysis in ANDA litigation, see supra Part IV of this Comment.
156. S. 2733, § 2(a).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides . . . .”).
158. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 152 (2014); see, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Mylan Pharm., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d. 824, 830–31 (S.D. Ind. 2015); AstraZeneca AB v.
Mylan Pharm., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 558 (D. Del. 2014); see also supra note 140.
However, the Supreme Court in TC Heartland held that the word “resides” in § 1400(b)
means where the corporate defendant was incorporated and does not include the location
of its principle place of business. TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC,
137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017). In this sense, the VENUE Act is broader than what is allowed
under TC Heartland.
159. S. 2733, § 2(a). To note, this provision is more specific than the second prong
of the patent specific venue statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (providing that venue is also
proper where the defendant has “a regular and established place of business”).
160. S. 2733, § 2(a). However, it should be noted, the VENUE Act does not define
what a regular and established physical facility is, nor does it provide any examples of
such a facility. See generally S. 2733. Nonetheless, it suffices to say that the sham offices
NPEs have in the Eastern District of Texas for the sole purpose of establishing venue
would not qualify.
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from employing sham offices and employees for the sole purpose of
establishing venue in Texas.161 As such, Congress strikes a good balance
between affording patent owners more leniency in where to bring suit and
reducing the likelihood of forum shopping, especially in reputed plaintifffriendly districts.
Although the residence or established physical facility requirement will
effectively eliminate the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas, some
legal scholars criticize the VENUE Act because it is likely to cause reconcentration of patent cases in other districts.162 “More than 50 percent
of all publicly traded companies in the United States, including 64 percent
of the Fortune 500, are incorporated in Delaware,” so a natural outcome
of this bill is that Delaware will see a dramatic increase in patent infringement
filings.163 Moreover, in ANDA litigation, New Jersey is a popular forum
because it is where many pharmaceutical companies are located.164 Likewise,
the VENUE Act is predicted to drive a surge of patent cases to the Northern
District of California, where a significant number of high technology companies
have their principle place of business.165

161. See Michael Su, Lionel Lavenue & Ben Cassady, Patent Reform Beyond the
Innovation Act: The VENUE Act, LAW360 (May 9, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/788794/patent-reform-beyond-the-innovation-act-the-venue-act [https://perma.cc/
8PE6-HDJ2]. Under the most recent “regular and established place of business” test advanced
by Judge Gilstrap, NPEs could still established proper venue in the Eastern District of
Texas relatively easily. See supra text accompanying note 76.
162. The group of twenty-eight law professors opposing the VENUE Act argued in
a letter to Congress that the Act “would not spread lawsuits throughout the country. . . .
[but instead] would likely result in concentrating more than 50% of patent lawsuits in just
two districts: the District of Delaware (where most publicly traded corporations are
incorporated) and the Northern District of California (where many patent defendants are
headquartered).” Crouch, supra note 94. This Comment will respond to this criticism in
Section VII.D. Meanwhile, the TC Heartland decision arguably created the same problem.
See Davis, supra note 67.
163. Su, Lavenue & Cassady, supra note 161.
164. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
165. Jason Rantanen, Guest Post: What Would Happen to Patent Cases if They
Couldn’t All Be Filed in Texas, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 11, 2016), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/03/
happen-patent-couldnt.html [https://perma.cc/S4V6-VWAT] (predicting that if the VENUE
Act were to pass, “Delaware would be the top venue [followed by] the Northern District
of California”). The Northern District of California is known to be less favorable to patent
holders than the Eastern District of Texas—they have an average win rate of 16% at N.D.
Cal. and at E.D. Texas, compared to the national average of 26%. See generally Klerman
& Reilly, supra note 17 (outlining the general data surrounding filing and win rates in patent
cases in various jurisdictions); Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact of Local Patent Rules on
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B. Venue by Specific Jurisdiction-Sufficient Contact
Nonetheless, the VENUE Act is unlikely to simply shift the concentration
of patent cases from Texas to Delaware and California, as opponents of
the act have predicted, because it provides additional mechanisms to
established proper venue.166 In addition to provisions that resemble the
general jurisdiction approach, the VENUE Act also provides for proper
venue based on research, development, or preparation activities for the
infringing products, analogous to the specific jurisdictional approach in
ANDA cases.167 First, under the VENUE Act, venue is proper in districts
where an inventor of the patent “has conducted research or development
that led to the application for the patent in suit.”168 Recall that in ANDA cases,
specific jurisdiction can be established in states where the ANDA is prepared
or where the generic drug is tested or developed.169 Similarly here, venue
is proper where the accused infringer has a facility that developed or
manufactured products embodying the patent in suit. Accordingly, this
provision is more stringent than the second prong of the current specific
venue statute, § 1400(b), but more lenient than the residence requirement
under the first prong.
Furthermore, under the specific jurisdiction approach, venue is proper
in districts where either party—the plaintiff or the defendant—has a “regular
and established physical facility that such party controls and operates, not
primarily for the purpose of creating venue, and has” a research, development,
or manufacturing nexus to the accused products embodying the invention.170
This provision distinguishes patent owners that practice their invention
from those that do not by conferring more latitude in venue to the former,
but not the latter. Patent owners that actually engage in patent research,
development, and manufacturing could enforce their rights in venues
convenient to them. For instance, university or research institute plaintiffs
could enforce their patents in forums where they are located, but NPEs
would not be able to file suit in the Eastern District to enforce a purchased
patent that was not developed in Texas.171 In another likely scenario,
Rate and Timing of Case Resolution Relative to Claim Construction: An Empirical Study
of the Past Decade, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 451 (2013).
166. The same group of twenty-eight professors opposing the VENUE Act also argued
that the venue limiting proposals serve as a mechanism for weakening patent holders’ rights
and catering to large corporations’ choice of defendant-friendly venues. See Crouch, supra
note 94. This Comment will address this criticism in Section VII.D.
167. See supra Section VI.C.
168. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th
Cong. § 2(a) (2016).
169. See supra note 128.
170. S. 2733, § 2(a).
171. See Su, Lavenue & Cassady, supra note 161.
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because Apple is headquartered in Cupertino, California, and designs,
develops, and sells its popular iPhone products in California, Apple could
sue its competitor Samsung for infringing the application logo design
patent in Northern California at its convenience.172 Conversely, because
NPEs do not engage in patent research and development, nor do they
manufacture products embodying the patents, they would not be able to
arbitrarily tie a patent to the Eastern District of Texas under this provision.173
As a result, this provision would significantly limit NPEs’ choices in forum
shopping, while preserving practicing patent owners’ ability to bring suits
in convenient forums.
C. Predicted Outcomes of the VENUE Act
Ultimately, the VENUE Act is a targeted reform to the patent system,
intended to accomplish three main objectives. First, the VENUE Act will
clarify statutory provisions governing where patent owners may sue to
enforce their patent rights. Second, the VENUE Act will reduce NPE forum
shopping at the Eastern District of Texas while affording practicing patent
owners sufficient choice in venue. Third, the VENUE Act will redistribute
case filings to other parts of the country in accordance with judicial economy.
The VENUE Act will also have the advantage of making it easy for plaintiffs
to identify which forum to bring suit—plaintiffs will not need to engage
in substantial research to find out where defendants are incorporated, have a
principle place of business, or operate a research, development, or manufacturing
facility.
A question that concerns scholars and practitioners alike is: Will the
VENUE Act achieve the objectives? In a recent study, Professor Collen
Chien and Professor Michael Risch gathered empirical filing data and
conducted an experiment to attempt to answer the question: where would
plaintiffs have filed patent infringement suits had the VENUE Act been

172. This scenario can be illustrated through the most recent battle between Apple
and Samsung over design patent damages. See Dennis Crouch, Samsung v. Apple: Design
Patent Damages May Be Limited to Components, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 6, 2016), http://patent
lyo.com/patent/2016/12/samsung-limited-components.html [https://perma.cc/GU24-JY8J].
Apple sued its competitor Samsung in the Northern District of California, alleging
infringement of various design patents related to iPhones. Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., 786 F.3d 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016). Apple was able
to bring suit under the current nationwide venue regime but will also be able to bring suit
under the VENUE Act.
173. See Su, Lavenue & Cassady, supra note 161.
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in place?174 Both professors studied 939 random cases filed in 2015 involving
1128 defendants and compared the actual filing venue to venues that
would be proper under the VENUE Act.175 Their results showed that, if the
VENUE Act were to be adopted, NPE plaintiffs would have significantly
constrained choices of where to file.176 Notably, NPE cases “would be
decidedly away from the Eastern District of Texas, though 19% of cases
could still be brought there, down from nearly 65%.”177
The next question was: what would happen to cases that could not be
filed under the VENUE Act? Professors Chien and Risch predicted a shift
of patent cases towards Delaware and Northern District of California under
the VENUE Act, as discussed earlier.178 Taken together, Professors Chien
and Risch’s model suggests that the VENUE Act would likely achieve its
intended goals in reducing patents case filings in the Eastern District of Texas
and redistributing cases to states where many companies are incorporated,
headquartered, or have an active practice of their patents.
D. Response to Criticism of the VENUE Act
Since its proposal, the VENUE Act has gathered considerable enthusiasm
and support from the community.179 However, some legal scholars have
voiced their opposition to the VENUE Act precisely because it is predicted
to cause re-concentration of cases Delaware and California, where most large
corporations are located.180 It would be analogous to the fact that most ANDA
litigation occurs in Delaware and New Jersey, where most pharmaceutical
companies are located.181 The group of twenty-eight professors opposing
the VENUE Act argued that the proponents of the act were “primarily large

174. Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, 77 MD. L.R.
47, 78 (2017).
175. Id. To note, their model calculated the number of cases in which venue would
not have been proper under the VENUE Act. This is slightly different from ascertaining
where the plaintiff would have brought suit had the VENUE Act been in place. This is
because even in those cases where venue would be considered proper under the VENUE Act,
the plaintiff might have had other choices and had filed in a different forum under the Act.
176. Id. at 89 (showing 54% of NPEs would not be able to file suits where they had
actually filed in 2015).
177. Id. at 91. In comparison, only 18% of operating company plaintiffs would have
to move their cases while the rest would still be able to sue in venues as they did. Id. at 89.
178. Id. at 91–92. Under Chien and Risch’s model, the District of Delaware, the
Eastern District of Texas, and the Northern District of California are predicted to hear
19.5%, 14.9%, and 12.8% of all patent cases, respectively, accounting for about 50% of
all cases in total. Id. at 93. These districts actually heard 9%, 44%, and 4% of patent cases,
respectively, in 2015. Id.
179. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 92.
180. See supra notes 162, 166.
181. See supra text accompanying note 112.

216

XING (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 55: 183, 2018]

8/7/2018 10:25 AM

VENUE Act and Venue in ANDA Litigation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

high-tech companies and retailers with an online presence sued in the
Eastern District of Texas that would rather litigate in a small number of
more defendant-friendly jurisdictions.”182 Big companies including Intel
and Dell—those that often find themselves defending patent infringement
suits in the Eastern District of Texas—filed amicus briefs in support of the
petitioner in TC Heartland and advocated for venue reform to prevent forumshopping, which suggests they will indeed benefit from the VENUE Act.183
On the contrary, inventors, patent owners, and a non-profit organization
representing inventors urged to keep the broad venue rules intact, cautioning
against a venue reform that is overly defendant-friendly.184 Critics of the
VENUE Act argue that the proposed venue reform “will unduly benefit
defendants by moving cases to their home districts.”185 Additionally, they
argue that the proposed reform would have “sweeping changes to our patent
system that would primarily benefit large infringers to the detriment of these
innovators and, ultimately, our innovation economy.”186 Finally, some critics
of the VENUE Act suggest forum shopping would not be eliminated even
if the VENUE Act were enacted.187 This argument is supported by the fact
that Delaware—the home of the vast majority of corporate entities—also
has plaintiff-friendly local rules and would likely become the next capital
of patent cases.188
However, critics inaccurately assess the VENUE Act when they claim
that it would disproportionally benefit corporate defendants by limiting
filings of patent infringement to their domicile state or where they operate
182. Crouch, supra note 94.
183. See Su, Lavenue & Cassady, supra note 161; see also, e.g., Brief of Intel Corp.
& Dell, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–7, TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft
Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341).
184. See Su, Lavenue & Cassady, supra note 161. To note, however, the venue reform
proposed in the VENUE Act affords significantly more leniency to practicing patentees
than is allowed under the Supreme Court’s TC Heartland decision because, under the
VENUE Act, practicing patentees can bring infringement suit in states where they develop,
practice the invention, or have an established physical facility relating to the patent at
issue. See supra Section VII.B.
185. Chien & Risch, supra note 174, at 85.
186. Crouch, supra note 94.
187. See id.
188. Id. On this point, some legal scholars have suggested a reform that could reduce
the incentive for litigants to forum shop and the ability of district courts to forum sell,
namely, by mandating increased procedural uniformity in patent cases across the country.
See Megan M. La Belle & Paul R. Gugliuzza, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: TC
Heartland and Patent Venue, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 16, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/
federal-circuit-heartland.html [https://perma.cc/WUV4-WN53].
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their research, development, and manufacturing activities. This is because
the VENUE Act also has counterbalancing provisions that allow patent
owners to enforce their rights in forums convenient to them. For instance,
venue is proper in districts where a named inventor “conducted research
and development that led to the application of the patent.”189 Venue is also
proper in districts where patent owners have an “established physical facility”
as well as research, development, or manufacturing activities involving the
patent.190 These two provisions allow significant freedom for practicing
entities to enforce their patent rights. The VENUE Act will likely prevent
NPEs from shopping for forums that do not have any tie to the patented
invention or the defendant, which is precisely what the act is intended
to achieve. Results from Professors Chien and Risch’s study also support
this bifurcated effect over practicing and non-practicing patent owners.191
Even if the proposed venue reform would simply replace Texas with
Delaware or Northern California as the new capital of patent cases, it is
still better than the status quo. The problem is not patent case concentration
per se; it is the concentration at a remote, irrelevant forum that is toxic to
the patent system.192 If most Delaware-incorporated companies or Silicon
Valley-based high technology companies are sued for patent infringement
in their respective resident states, the defendants will have sufficient ties
and resources needed for litigation close to the forum court, consistent
with the concept of judicial economy.193 A corporation voluntarily seeking
to incorporate in a state is bound by its “home” state laws and can hardly

189. Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th
Cong. § 2(a) (2016).
190. Id.
191. See Chien & Risch, supra note 174, at 92 (predicting the VENUE Act would more
disproportionately affect NPEs than plaintiffs that actually perform research, development, and
manufacturing).
192. Crouch, supra note 94 (“In the abstract, concentration of cases is not necessarily
bad—here though, the particular arguable “badness” is that the high concentration of cases
is in the Eastern District of Texas rather than Silicon Valley, New York, Chicago, or
Delaware.”).
193. Although many companies are incorporated in Delaware because of its favorable
corporate and tax laws and although these companies may have little connection to the
state, they “can hardly complain about being sued” in Delaware because they expect to be
subject to all types of lawsuits given personal jurisdiction laws’ long history. See Chien &
Risch, supra note 174, at 85. On this note, the VENUE Act is consistent with the Supreme
Court decision in Daimler, which held that the “paradigm bases” for exercising general
jurisdiction over corporate defendants were “place of incorporation and principle place of
business.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014); see also supra note 137 and
accompanying text. If a plaintiff can sue a corporate defendant for any cause of action in
the state where the defendant is incorporated, the plaintiff can certainly sue for patent
infringement in that state.

218

XING (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 55: 183, 2018]

8/7/2018 10:25 AM

VENUE Act and Venue in ANDA Litigation
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

complain about being sued in their home state for matters arising out of
regular course of business.194
Moreover, by allowing plaintiffs to sue where defendant corporations
are incorporated or headquartered, the VENUE Act will have an added benefit
of clustering patent cases by industry, which promotes efficiency and
uniformity of patent case adjudication.195 For instance, Northern California
will handle mostly patents involving high technologies while New Jersey
will continue to handle mostly pharmaceutical patent cases. Some scholars
have suggested that patent cases clustering would “promote better
decisionmaking . . . by tending to aggregate technology and industry-specific
patent cases in those districts that already have clusters of business engaging
in a technology or industry.”196 Finally, because the District of Delaware
and the Northern District of California already have extensive experience
in patent law, the district courts are unlikely to be overwhelmed by an
increase of patent cases on their docket. For example, Delaware is the
second most popular state in general patent litigation and the most popular
state in ANDA litigation, and it manages patent cases routinely.197 Thus, the
VENUE Act, if passed, might not cause such a dramatic change in patent
case filings as its critics fear.198
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Forum shopping is not a foreign concept to patent law. However, the
recent staggering concentration of patent cases, especially those filed by
NPEs in the Eastern District of Texas, plagues our patent systems and has
led to low quality adjudication, undue pressure on defendant corporations,
and waste of judicial economy. The reason for forum shopping in patent
194. See Chien & Risch, supra note 174, at 85.
195. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV., 1444, 1444 (2010)
(“Harnessing patentography by restricting venue in patent litigation to the principal place
of business of one of its defendants will help repair [problems—including forum shopping—
and that] . . . [c]lustering together large numbers of an industry’s patent cases in a limited
number of district courts will develop those courts’ proficiencies in patent law and in the
underlying industry-specific facts critical to sound legal determinations.”).
196. Id. at 1478–79.
197. See supra text accompanying note 67.
198. Regarding the criticism that Delaware would replace Texas as the new destination
of forum shopping due to its plaintiff-friendly procedural rules, it is simply beyond the
scope of this Comment and the VENUE Act to address the differences in local rules among
district courts. For further reading on the differences in procedural rules among district
courts, see Klerman & Reilly, supra note 17.
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cases is the ambiguity in the venue statute and the room for broad judicial
interpretation, despite the most recent Supreme Court landmark case TC
Heartland.199 In light of the limitation of judicial remedies, congressional
reform of the venue law remains the most viable avenue. Now before Congress
is the VENUE Act—a Senate bill that specifically targets the venue provisions
and aims to curb abusive patent litigation practices, restrict where NPEs
can file suit, and promote filings in accordance to both patent owners’ and
corporations’ interests.
By comparing the language of the VENUE Act to the current
jurisdictional scheme in ANDA litigation, this Comment seeks to shed light
on how the proposed venue reform will operate and how likely it is going
to achieve the intended results. The VENUE Act would likely be effective
at limiting NPEs’ choice of where to file suits while protecting practicing
patentees’ ability to enforce their patent rights, redistributing patent cases
to states with more prominent corporate or operation activities, as well as
clustering patent cases by industry—all in favor of achieving efficient
judicial economy.
The future of the VENUE Act under the current administration remains
uncertain.200 It requires the collective efforts of lawmakers, patent practitioners,
and the science and technology industry to advocate venue reform to the
current administration.201 Meanwhile, in her first post-election speech,
the then Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Michelle Lee,
sounded optimistic about the incoming administration:
Support for IP in the United States has a long history of bipartisanship, and there’s
no reason to imagine that changing with a new president and a new Congress, both
of whom have economic growth as a top priority. . . . I’m optimistic the incoming
administration will share our appreciation of the importance of intellectual property
as a driver of economic growth.202

199. TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
200. The 2017 Trump administration casts some uncertainty on the VENUE Act
because president Trump’s views on patent law remain largely unknown. Ryan Davis,
Patent Legislation Has Uncertain Path in Trump Presidency, LAW360 (Nov. 10, 2016,
8:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/861705?utm_source=shared-articles&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=shared-articles [https://perma.cc/JP7H-3WMM]. Some
observers of the Trump campaign worried that patent reform might not be high on the
president’s agenda, rendering bills like the VENUE Act in hiatus for the near future. Id.
201. See id.
202. Dennis Crouch, Director Lee: IP is a Necessary Key Piece of President-Elect Trump’s
Promised Economic Growth and Job Creation, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 15, 2016), http://patentlyo.
com/patent/2016/11/necessary-president-promised.html?utm_target/=feedburner&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentlyO+%28Dennis+Crouch%27s+Paten
tly-O%29 [https://perma.cc/J253-GN35].
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In conclusion, intellectual property has historically been a driving force
of innovation within the United States. It is vitally important that the
patent system operates efficiently and that abusive practices such as forum
shopping are limited. Given what is at stake, venue reform—as proposed
by the VENUE Act—is a cause worth fighting for.
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